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Abstract—With the increased attention and legislation for data-
privacy, collaborative machine learning (ML) algorithms are
being developed to ensure the protection of private data used for
processing. Federated learning (FL) is the most popular of these
methods, which provides privacy preservation by facilitating
collaborative training of a shared model without the need to
exchange any private data with a centralized server. Rather,
an abstraction of the data in the form of a machine learning
model update is sent. Recent studies showed that such model
updates may still very well leak private information and thus
a more structured risk assessment is needed. In this paper, we
analyze existing vulnerabilities of FL and subsequently perform
a literature review of the possible attack methods targeting
FL privacy protection capabilities. These attack methods are
then categorized by a basic taxonomy. Additionally, we provide
a literature study of the most recent defensive strategies and
algorithms for FL aimed to overcome these attacks. These
defensive strategies are categorized by their respective underlying
defense principle. The paper concludes that the application of
a single defensive strategy is not enough to provide adequate
protection to all available attack methods.
Index Terms—Federated learning, privacy protection, attack
methods, defensive strategies
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning algorithms have grown significantly in capa-
bilities and popularity in the past decade. Advances in com-
puting performance, increased data availability (and decreased
data-storage costs) and advances in more effective algorithms
have created a surge of new applications using deep learning
algorithms.
For these algorithms to be accurate, generally a large
amount of task-specific data is needed. Conventionally, this
data is gathered and stored on an accessible centralized server,
which is becoming increasingly cheap to access due to the
increasing bandwidths available for remote data storage and
retrieval.
This centralized data storage, however, introduces two prob-
lems. First, due to the exponential increase of data collectors
in the field, the amount of data that is collected is becoming
excessively large, which in turn increases the bandwidth
requirements for communication as well as the computational
requirements needed for processing. Second, devices may
gather data of sensitive nature which is subject to privacy laws
and regulations [1]. Therefore, it is important to manage this
sensitive data in a way that protects privacy. To combat these
problems alternative ways of decentralized learning have been
proposed, most notably that of federated learning.
FL [2] is a specific form of distributed learning methods [3]
which relies on the notion that no actual data need to be sent
to a centralized server. Rather, an abstraction in the form of
machine learning models is sent to the server instead. These
models are trained locally on client-side devices with the
clients’ datasets. These updated models are sent back to the
centralized server. Then, the server aggregates these models
into a single model and sends this model back to the clients.
This process is illustrated in Figure 1. As this process happens
multiple times iteratively, all clients jointly train the shared
model. FL claims to have distinct privacy advantages over tra-
ditional centralized data-driven model training approaches as
well as reducing communication bandwidth requirements [2].
These privacy advantages are focused on protecting sensitive
data from external adversaries, but it does not guarantee safety
against internal adversaries such as malicious servers.
FL has been demonstrated to outperform traditional training
methods in certain cases. Researchers demonstrated an imple-
mentation for next word prediction on mobile devices [4], [5]
as well as emoticon prediction [6] among others. Furthermore,
FL has found its use in medical applications as well [7]–[12]
which, due to the sensitive nature of medical data, creates a
need for justification of the safety of FL. This safety comes
two-fold: First, FL should protect against adversarial clients.
Second, due to modern information storage legislation (such as
the General Data Protection Regulation or GDPR [1]) private
user data may not be gathered without the users’ consent.
Therefore FL must be shown to be secure against the server
obtaining private user information from the user models.
However, recent research has shown multiple vulnerabilities
in the privacy protection capabilities of FL [13]–[24]. These
attack methods cast a shadow on the applicability of FL for
privacy-sensitive information.
In this paper, we present an overview of attack methods
known to affect FL and provide a basic taxonomy to classify
these methods. Furthermore, we provide a literature review
of defensive strategies against such attack methods which we
categorize by their respective underlying defensive strategy.
This will help researchers to appropriately weigh the capa-
bilities and risks involved in using FL for privacy-sensitive
information.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the
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Fig. 1. Top: The Federated learning process: A) A model is sent from the
servers to the devices. B) The devices train the model further on their local
dataset. C) The devices send their model back to the server which combines
them into a singular model.
Bottom: The points of vulnerability defining the attack surface (AS) for server-
side and client-side attack methods.
concept of adversarial attacks in the FL context. Section III
presents the FL attack methods already published in the liter-
ature. Then Section IV discusses defensive strategies able to
counteract possible attack methods. Section V outlines related
work already published on the topic. Finally, Section VI ends
with the conclusions.
II. THREAT MODEL
A. Attack surface
In general, an adversary attacking an FL model has one of
two adversarial goals. First and foremost is to extract private
information from victim clients. A second goal is to purpose-
fully force the model to behave differently than intended. This
can take the form of introducing backdoors, inducing miss-
classification or even rendering the model unusable.
Throughout this paper, an adversary is considered to be on
the inside, meaning it could be one of the clients participating
in the FL system or could be the centralized server itself.
This consideration is justified by the assumption that all
communication between the server and the different clients can
be done with the latest cryptographic security. One of the key
principals for which FL was developed is that the server is not
allowed to have access to any of the private training samples of
the clients. Therefore, the honest-but-curious server model is
considered in the threat model as well. Unless stated otherwise,
the basic form of FL is the one used in the assessment of the
threats.
The attack surface is the summation of exploitable vulner-
abilities in the system. The viable attack surface in FL is
subdivided for the case of a malicious client and malicious
server. The vulnerable points of attack of FL are illustrated in
the bottom part of Figure 1.
The attack surface for a malicious server consists of the
following exploitable points. 1) The ability to adapt the model
sent to all clients and/or ability to determine and regulate the
participating clients. Furthermore, the server can send custom
models to targeted clients. 2) The ability to differentiate the
model updates from clients before aggregation. 3) The server
is knowledgeable of the aggregate model.
The attack surface for malicious clients consists of the
following usable exploits. 1) The client has access to the
aggregate model. 2) The ability to manipulate the data on
which the client trains the model, as well as regulating the
training process. 3) The ability to manipulate their gradient
update. 4) The ability to influence the impact of their model
during aggregation.
There are several ways to characterize FL attacks based
on their source, nature, etc. Figure 2 shows the taxonomy of
the different characteristics we use in this paper to describe
FL attacks. In the following, each one the shown taxonomy
classes is discussed, along with the general vulnerabilities FL
has.
B. Client or server-side attacks
In this paper, all communication between the server and the
clients is assumed to be secure. Only the clients and server
themselves are considered viable points for the execution of
attack methods. Therefore, the system is only considered to be
vulnerable either on the client-side or the server-side. The one
exception to this rule is the man-in-the-middle attack, where
an adversary pretends to be a server to the client or/and a client
to the server and is therefore in-between the communication.
Such an adversary is assumed to have the same threat model
as for server-side vulnerabilities.
C. Black-box or white-box attacks
White-box attacks mean that the adversary has complete
knowledge of the system except for the private data. Black-
box attacks mean that the adversary is limited and is only able
to use the system without any detailed knowledge of the inner
workings of the system.
In the federated averaging algorithm, the clients are assumed
to have a full description of the model and are therefore
vulnerable to white-box attacks. On the server-side, this is also
true but recent studies propose models in which the server has
no knowledge of the model other than its conception [25].
This might force the server-side attacks towards a black-box
scenario.
In some cases, it is possible to extract information about
the systems architecture and thereby force the black-box
towards a more white-box threat model. Method such as GPU-
snooping can be exploited [26] or model extraction for online
services [27].
D. Active or passive attacks
Active attacks imply that the attack method relies on manip-
ulating the system by adapting parameters, communication or
other system-properties to achieve adversarial goals. Because
these types of attack influence the working system they are
in a general sense detectable. Active attacks may also be
responsible for corruption the system to a point where it is
no longer properly functioning.
Passive attacks imply that the attack method can be per-
formed without the need to adapt any parameters in the system.
Since these attack methods leave no trace of their execution,
they are generally impossible to detect, which makes them a
more dangerous set of attack methods.
Classes of FL attacks
Client or 
server-side
Black or 
white-box
Active or 
passive Attack goals
Sample  
reconstruction
Information  
inference
Model  
corruption
Runtime 
misclassification
Fig. 2. Taxonomy to classify the different types of FL attack methods
E. Attacker goal
Each attack should be classified by the goal of the adversary.
The attacks presented in this paper fall in one of the following
four adversarial goals.
1. Sample reconstruction aims to objectively reveal what
training data was used by the clients. The success of the
attacker in achieving this goal can be assessed by comparing
the similarity of the reconstruction with the original data. The
ability to launch a reliable sample reconstruction attack is the
most intrusive concerning private information since it reveals
sensitive information in full. If a sample reconstruction attack
can be carried out with relative ease by the server or an
adversary, the system as a whole may not claim to be privacy-
preserving.
2. Information inference attacks aim to learn private infor-
mation more speculatively. This information may consist of:
• Inferring class representatives—This type of inference
tries to recreate samples that would not stand out in the
original dataset. When successfully creating such samples
the adversary can learn a lot about the underlying dataset.
• Inferring membership (of the sample)—When provided a
sample, membership inference tries to accurately deter-
mine if this sample has been used for the training of the
network.
• Inferring data properties—This attack tries to infer meta-
characteristics of the used dataset (e.g. the data consists
of mostly red cars).
• Inferring samples/labels—This attack aims to accurately
recreate (rather than reconstruct) training-samples that
were used during the training session and/or associated
labels that were used during training.
3. Model corruption aims to change the model to the
benefit of the attacker. Such attacks can introduce exploitable
backdoors in the model or even make the entire model useless.
Model corruption attacks are generally not assumed to violate
the privacy of participating clients.
4. Runtime misclassification attacks aim to trick the model
into making erroneous predictions during runtime. FL is sus-
ceptible to these types of attacks similar to non-distributed ML
methods. Generally, runtime misclassification attacks do not
violate client privacy directly but may be used to circumvent
ML-based security measures.
III. ATTACK METHODS
Table I lists the attack methods proposed in the literature as
well as their characteristics. In the following, we discuss each
one of these methods, classified according to their associated
attack goals. Table II illustrates the exploited vulnerabilities
of the hereafter listed attack methods.
A. Attacks targeting reconstruction
1) Loss-function/ReLu exploitation: Sannai [28] describes
a mathematical framework that (given access to a white-box
model) can determine what relation the input has to a given
loss at the output. It relies on the non-smoothness of the ReLu
function and has been argued to work solely on deep neural
networks. Due to the use of ReLu activation on each layer, an
adversary can compute backwards which nodes were activated.
Several polynomials that describe the input-output relation can
be formulated and subsequently, these polynomials are used
to calculate what training samples are consistent with the loss
surface at the output.
The application domain of this attack method is limited
to linear models with incorporated ReLu activation functions.
Furthermore, this method is weak against any form of noise
due to its strict mathematical nature. Unfortunately, no demon-
stration is given of the workings of this attack method.
2) First dense layer attack: Le Trieu et al. [16] showed
mathematically that gradients of a model may in some cases
reveal the training data. This attack relies on the fact that the
gradients of all weights accumulated in a neuron are scaled
linearly to the activation of the prior layer [16], [29]. In the
case that a client has trained on a singular sample, this method
fully reconstructs this trained sample.
This attack method is not applicable to recurrent neural
networks and requires extra algorithms to be useful in for
convolutional networks. Furthermore, as the local dataset
TABLE I
FL ATTACK METHODS AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS
Attack method Attacker Active/passive
White-box /
Black-box Attack goal Restricted to
Loss-function/ReLu Server Passive White-box Sample reconstruction Linear net + ReLu
First dense layer Server Passive White-box Sample reconstruction Non-recurrent, small local dataset
DLG/iDLG Server Passive White-box Sample reconstruction Small local dataset
MIA Server Passive Both Inference Linear nets, small input space
mGAN-AI Server Both White-box Inference Requires auxiliary dataset, synthesizable data
GAN Client Active White-box Inference Sparse client-set
Adversarial example Client Passive White-box Misclassification Limited practical use
Model poisoning Client Active Both Model corruption, backdoor
grows larger the reconstructions that are to be performed with
this method will become more unreliable. Still, this remains
a very viable attack method due to its ease of use and near-
constant computational cost.
3) DLG/iDLG: A recent algorithm called Deep Leakage
from Gradients (DLG) describes an optimization algorithm
that reproduces the training sample iteratively by optimizing
the input to produce the correct gradients for a client. A slight
variation to this algorithm also proves to be viable for slightly
larger batches of samples [14]. In a follow-up paper, a different
research group proposes improved DLG (iDLG) as a more
efficient and accurate version of DLG [15]. DLG and iDLG are
applicable only when the local dataset of a client is sufficiently
small due to the required high computation costs for reliable
results on larger batches.
B. Attacks targeting inference
1) Model inversion attacks (MIA): The model inversion
attack introduced by Fredrikson et al. [17] works on the
premise that the trained linear model is accessible to the
adversary in a black-box fashion. The adversary may only
provide its input and collect the respective output. Also, the
adversary has incomplete information about the input and
complete information about the output. This data is used to
detect correlations between the (still unknown) input variables
and the known output values [17]. It does this rather crudely
by ’brute forcing’ all variations of unknown input-values to
predict the most likely private feature. A practical application
is knowing a victim’s personalized outcome of a model, as
well as some publicly known features such as age, gender,
etc. These features allow the adversary to reasonably predict
the missing data.
A follow-up work presents a new version that has a black-
box and white-box applicability [18]. This white-box attack
works by trying to predict the most likely input for a given
label. This allows the adversary to reconstruct a generalized
input image for a specific label.
The model inversion attack is only applicable in linear
models. Furthermore, the authors note that it is often quite
easy to come up with models for which this attack method
does not work. A big weakness of this attack is that it is
computationally infeasible for large input spaces since it in
essence brute-forces all input combinations.
2) mGAN-AI: The multitask GAN for Auxiliary Identifi-
cation (mGAN-AI) attack relies heavily on the training of
GANs to reconstruct accurate approximate training samples.
This method of attack requires the model updates from each
client and an auxiliary dataset. From these updates, a set of
fake input images is generated which result in the same update.
Then a discriminator network tries to figure out: 1. if these
images are fake or real, 2. to which client these images belong,
and 3. to which category the images belong.
After some training, the mGAN-AI can provide a revealing
reconstruction of training samples belonging to a victim client.
In addition to this passive attack, the authors also describe
an active variant which works in the same way but ensures
that non-clients don not participate. This allows the GAN
to optimize its reproduction capabilities towards a targeted
victim [19]. Demonstrative results show that this technique
is very viable to compromise client-level privacy.
This method of attack is only applicable in cases where
clients have mostly homogeneous data and there is an auxil-
iary dataset available. Since the method relies on generative
adversarial networks, this method is only applicable on data
which can be synthesized.
3) GAN: This attack actively targets a victim client to
release private data by poisoning the shared model in the
adversaries favour. In a simple setting, the adversary uses
the shared model to differentiate the victim’s model update
from which the adversary learns which labels have been used.
Then the adversary uses a generative adversarial network
(GAN) [30] to generate images for one of the labels exclu-
sively used by the victim. The adversary then purposefully
mislabels these images as one of the labels exclusively used
by itself. The gradients of the victim will become steeper as
the generated and subsequently mislabeled images get more
re-presentable as the victim’s images [20].
There is some critique to this attack. Although useful in
a controlled environment, this attack method supposes that
the victim and adversary share at least one shared label and
one exclusive mutual label which is unrealistic as the client
pool gets larger. Additionally, it is infeasible to distinguish
TABLE II
EXPLOITED VULNERABILITIES PER ATTACK. THE VULNERABILITIES ARE ILLUSTRATED IN FIGURE 1
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GAN 3
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a targeted victim in a practical federated setting due to the
randomness of the selected clients and the degradation of
influence of the adversary when averaging weights [19].
C. Attacks targeting misclassification
Here we discuss only adversarial example attacks as a form
of misclassification attacks. Adversarial example attacks aim
to produce samples that will be purposefully misclassified at
runtime [31], [32]. Federated learning is vulnerable to this
because the deployment of the model means that adversaries
have virtually no restrictions when crafting adversarial exam-
ples. If the intended use of the model is, for example, on-
device authentication (e.g. by means of face recognition) then
adversarial example attacks can be very effective.
D. Attacks targeting model corruption
Here we discuss only model poisoning attacks as a form
of model corruption attacks. Using this attack method, every
client can directly influence the weights of the shared model
which means that poisoning the shared model becomes trivial.
Model poisoning can be used to introduce a backdoor which
can be leveraged by the adversary [21]–[24].
A specific attack method designed for FL was demonstrated
by Bagdasaryan et al. [22]. The attack poisons the model
by exploiting the fact that a client can change the entire
shared model by declaring that it has a significantly large
amount of samples. This allows a client to change the shared
model in order to insert a backdoor. One example use case is
forcing a shared model to be biased towards an adversarial la-
bel/prediction, such as forcing a word auto-completion model
to suggest a brand name, or to force a model to incorrectly
classify images of a political figure as inappropriate.
Similar work by Bhagoji et al. [33] demonstrate the viability
of this method further and show how this attack method can be
used in a stealth manner. Furthermore, they demonstrate how
to circumvent byzantine-robust aggregation mechanisms [34],
[35]. These types of aggregation algorithms are designed
specifically to reduce the influence of singular clients.
A different approach is taken by Fung et al. [24] where,
rather than relying on boosting of sample numbers or gradi-
ents, the adversary is capable of joining and leaving different
federated clients. This type of attack is called a sybil-based
attack [24], [36]. The adversary can then return a multitude of
poisoned models back to the server each iteration.
Closely related to sybil attacks are joint-effort model-
poisoning attacks. Anecdotal evidence suggests a possible
vulnerability for models that train on user input. For example,
a twitter chat-bot developed by Microsoft that learned from
user communication was corrupted by a coordinated effort of
users to post racist and sexist tweets [37].
In addition to model poisoning attacks, there are also data
poisoning attacks. These types of attacks can be successfully
used for adversarial goals such as flipping labels [24], [38].
However, it is noted that for FL all data poisoning attacks are
inferior to model poisoning attacks for the simple reason that
the data is not sent to the server. Therefore, anything that can
be achieved with poisonous data is equally viable by poisoning
the model [13], [33].
IV. DEFENSIVE MEASURES
This section describes various strategies proposed in the
literature for increasing the security of the basic FL algo-
rithm [2]. Defensive measures found in multiple works of liter-
ature are group by their underlying defensive strategy. Table IV
lists the defensive measures that are discussed in this section
and displays their effectiveness against the aforementioned
attack methods. Different strategies will prove more valuable
to thwart different attack methods and generally a combination
of defensive measures is required for optimal defensiveness. In
this table, the v symbol represents limited effectiveness of the
defensive measure. This means that the attacker needs to per-
form extra steps to achieve its goal reliably or that the attacker
may not presume that the outcome of the attack is reliable
(e.g. very noisy reconstructions). Furthermore, the ∗ symbol
represents the cases where the context of implementation is
crucially important for the evaluation of effectiveness. For
example, to assure privacy protection with differential privacy,
TABLE III
THIS MATRIX ILLUSTRATES THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DEFENSIVE MEASURES AGAINST THE ATTACK SURFACE AS ILLUSTRATED IN FIGURE 1
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Gradient Subset − + v − − − −
Gradient Compression v v − v − − −
Dropout − v − v − v v
DP − + v v − − −
SMC − + − v − − v
Homomorphic encryption + + + − − − −
Robust aggregation − − − − + + +
the amplitude of noise that is to be added may result in a
non-converging collaboratively trained model. Whereas lesser
amplitudes prompt viability of an attack method. Table III
illustrates the added protection for the specific vulnerable
points illustrated in 1.
A. Gradient subset
Initially proposed for the use of Distributed distributed
stochastic gradient descent (DSGD), only a subset of all
gradients should be communicated to improve communication
efficiency [39]. The authors propose a selection method for
communicating only the most important gradients as well
as adding a randomized weight selection variant. Such a
randomized variant is also proposed briefly for a federated
setting by [40] for increasing communication efficiency. Yoon
et al. [41] proposed a different gradient subset approach and
subsequently demonstrated that sending sparse and selective
gradients can improve performance for a non-IID dataset.
As a defensive measure, such methods reduce the available
information the server has from any client. The incompleteness
of such information may cause problems for some attack meth-
ods to reliably infer information from the update. However,
recent studies show that such methods do not prevent adver-
saries from inferring reliable information from victims [29],
[42].
B. Gradient compression
Although mainly devised for the use of communication
efficiency, lossy compression techniques may also be im-
plemented to facilitate some form of information security.
Konecny et al. [40] demonstrate how such a method reduces
communication costs. The server only has victim specific
incomplete information.
Other forms of compression are also possible. An autoen-
coder compressor is proposed to encrypt data transfer [43] in
which the server trains an autoencoder on dummy-gradient
updates, and subsequently releases the encoding part to each
of the clients whilst keeping the decoder part secretive. Every
gradient update from each client is now encoded before trans-
fer to the server and decoded server side. This has a couple of
advantages. First, the model is compressed by the encoder
which will increase communication efficiency. Second, the
encoding and decoding result in some information loss about
the gradient update. How well this measure prevents the server
from malicious reconstruction remains to be seen.
C. Dropout
Another way to try to increase defensiveness is to employ
a technique called dropout [44]. Although generally used to
prevent over-fitting [45], dropout does introduce a certain
(finite) randomness to the gradient updates. Training on a set
of data-points will not have a deterministic gradient update
associated with it, which reduces the exploitable attack surface.
Due to the feature-generalizing nature of dropout, it could have
an adverse effect if the goal is to infer generalized data rather
than exact information. This was demonstrated by [42].
D. Differential privacy (DP)
Differential privacy [46] aims to ensure privacy mathemat-
ically by introducing noise to variables in the system. DP is
often regarded as one of the strongest privacy standards since it
provides rigorous provability of privacy. DP has been success-
fully implemented on machine learning applications such as
linear regression [47], SVM’s [48], and deep learning [49],
[50]. One method to achieve this is to perturb the model
before the optimization step in the learning algorithm [51].
Others apply the perturbation at different stages of the SGD
algorithm [50], [52]. However, it is challenging to implement
DP in an FL context. DP works best when each client has
access to a significantly large dataset [52]. Since the available
data can vary in size between clients, the DP sensitivity should
be considered on a per-client basis. Bonawitz et al. [53]
proposed a DP implementation for federated averaging for
an LSTM language model by clipping gradient updates and
adding the noise at the server-side. This ensures that clients
cannot infer or attack other clients but may not guarantee
safety against server-side attacks. Geyer et al. [54] expanded
on this work by implementing FL with DP on an image
recognition network. Triastcyn et al. [55] demonstrated FL
with Bayesian DP which may provide faster convergence in
setting where the data is similarly distributed over participating
clients. Bayesian DP leverages this distribution to justify lesser
noise amplitude while still retaining the same or even tighter
privacy bounds.
E. Secure multiparty computation (SMC)
Secure multiparty computation schemes are algorithms that
allow two or more participants to jointly compute functions
over their collective data without disclosing any data to the
other party. Using such methods to securely aggregate the
gradient models from individual clients can be used to shield
clients from the server.
Common SMC schemes are developed for the use in
secure two-party computation in which there are only two
communicating/computing entities. Such schemes have also
been developed for the use of joined machine learning [56]–
[59]. In terms of federated learning, this often requires two
untrusting servers that connect to some or all the participating
clients.
Other than two-party computation, three-party communica-
tion have been proposed as-well [60]–[63]. These methods
rely on at least semi-honest participants or an honest majority.
Mohassel et al. [60] proposed a novel solution in which three
servers use SMC to compute ML-model aggregates. They
additionally hint towards a structure in which the clients are
subdivided and represented by different servers. If the server
is to be trusted, such a structure can even be extended to
a hierarchical structure in which a server represents several
underlying servers.
For federated learning, one key weakness is that the server
can know exactly a specific clients gradient update and
thereby might infer information about a targeted victim client.
Bonawitz et al. [64] proposed a combination of several proto-
cols to ensure security in a practical federated setting through
obscuring the aggregation from the server.
TABLE IV
A MATRIX THAT DESCRIBES THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DEFENSIVE
MEASURES AGAINST ATTACK METHODS. +: RELIABLY EFFECTIVE, v:
LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS, −: THE DEFENSIVE MEASURE MAY BE
PRESUMED WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE OR TRIVIALLY CIRCUMVENTED, ∗:
CONTEXT DEPENDENT EFFECTIVENESS.
Attacks
L
os
s-
fu
nc
tio
n/
R
el
u
Fi
rs
t
de
ns
e
la
ye
r
D
L
G
/iD
L
G
M
IA
m
G
A
N
-A
I
G
A
N
A
dv
er
sa
ri
al
ex
am
pl
e
M
od
el
po
is
on
in
g
D
ef
en
se
s
Gradient Subset + v v + v v − −
Gradient Comp v − − v v v v −
Dropout + − − + v + + v
DP + ∗ + + ∗ + + −
SMC − v v v + − − −
Homomorphic enc + + + + + − − −
Robust aggregation − − − v − v − +
F. Homomorphic encryption
Homomorphic encryption relies on a mathematical encryp-
tion method in which mathematical operations applied on an
encrypted message result in the same mathematical operation
being applied to the original message when the message
is decrypted. Using homomorphic encryption in federated
learning theoretically ensures no performance loss in terms
of model convergence [29].
Homomorphic encryption comes in three forms: Partially
Homomorphic Encryption (PHE) which allow only a sin-
gle type of operation. Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption
(SWHE) which allow multiple mathematical operations for
only a bounded number of applications. Fully Homomor-
phic Encryption (FHE) which allows unlimited amounts of
operations without restriction [65]. Homomorphic encryption
is especially suitable for ensuring privacy against an un-
trustworthy server. Such a method was proposed by [16] to
secure DSGD but may easily be adapted to work on federated
averaging. Homomorphic encryption has been proposed as a
means to ensure privacy for medical data as-well [66]–[68].
Dowlin et al. [69] proposed an implementation for learning
on encrypted data with so-called cryptonets. Phong et al.
demonstrated a simple yet effective additive homomorphic
scheme for federated learning [29].
Other collaborative learning strategies include the use of ho-
momorphic encryption to encrypt data and allow a centralized
server to train on this encrypted data [70], [71]
Homomorphic encryption does have some major drawbacks
that are especially relevant for large scale implementation.
First, practically viable fully homomorphic encryption such
as FHE generally has large computation overhead which often
makes its implementation impractical [59], [65], [68]. Second,
for SWHE the data-size of the encrypted models increase
linearly with each homomorphic operation [65]. Thus the
encrypted models are notably larger than the plain model,
thereby increasing communication costs. Third, homomor-
phic encryption requires communication between participating
clients to facilitate key-sharing protocols. Communication be-
tween clients is not desired in FL and this also introduces
a possible vulnerability if new clients should be able to
join in-between training rounds. Fourth, without additional
safeguards, homomorphic encryption is still vulnerable to all
client-side attacks. Additionally, problems may arise for the
evaluation of the model. Lastly, it should be noted that the
server in a proper homomorphic scheme does not have direct
access to the jointly trained model, which is (generally) the
reason for the server to do FL in the first place.
G. Robust aggregation
In the regular FL setting [2] a client sends the newly
trained model as well as the number of samples it has back
to the server. Since the client can alter these values more ro-
bust aggregation methods are required that prohibit malicious
clients from exploiting the weighted averaging approach (in
which the weights are determined by clients local data size).
Furthermore, multiple clients may work together to conceal
their malicious efforts. The centralized server has no way
of knowing which of the clients are malicious. This is often
revered to as problems involving Byzantine clients [72].
Blanchard et al. [34] addressed this problem by proposing
an aggregation rule called Krum which minimizes the sum
of squared distances over the model updates. Effectively
removing outliers that are supposedly provided by byzantine
clients. Hereby the aggregation is secure against at most less
than
n− 2
2
byzantine workers among n clients. Although this
method is exploitable still [73].
El Mhamdi et al. [73] proposed a byzantine–resilient aggre-
gation rule which is to be used in combination with other rules
named Bulyan for the use in DSGD. Hereby the aggregation
is secure against at most
n− 3
4
byzantine workers among n
clients.
Li et al. [74] proposed a weighting strategy by reliability
for the use of Heterogeneous Data. The ’source reliability’ is
determined by calculating the distance between the clients’
update and the aggregate update.
Pilluta et al. [75] proposed an approximate geometric me-
dian for the use in federated learning and demonstrated its
effectiveness by introducing model corrupting updates and
data. The results demonstrate only a substantial robustness
improvement for linear models.
Harry Hsu et al. [76] proposed a server-side momentum
implementation specifically for the use of non-IID client
datasets. Combined with the random client selection native
to federated learning [2] this may greatly reduce the influence
a malicious client has over a multitude of rounds.
Chang et al. [25] devised a clever knowledge-sharing
algorithm for robust privacy-preserving, and heterogeneous
federated learning named Cronus. Their algorithm relies on
a publicly available dataset known to all clients. Instead
of sending model updates, participating clients send their
predicted labels from the publicly available samples. Their
subsequent aggregation uses the robust mean estimation [77]
algorithm which is specifically developed or high dimensional
robust aggregation. Hereafter the aggregated labels are sent to
all clients, which subsequently use these labels to update their
local model. Cronus has been demonstrated to be consistently
robust against basic model poisoning strategies at the cost of
model accuracy.
V. RELATED WORK
There is a small number of papers available that discuss
different attack methods and defensive strategies for FL mod-
els. A recent survey paper [13] only lists attack methods and
assesses their value on the implementation method of the
federated algorithm. Other works on federated learning such
as [78], [79] list various defensive strategies but are more
focused on implementation and application consideration of
FL. Xu et al. [80] provides a taxonomy by which to list
defensive strategies and subsequently shows a small number of
defensive strategies categorized. Kairouz et al. [81] provide an
elaborate description of open problems in FL. These problems
are accompanied by a detailed description of privacy concerns
in terms of exploitable vulnerabilities and defenses.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper discussed the basic principles of FL and showed
multiple vulnerabilities FL has to insider attacks. A client can-
not assume that data privacy is preserved since the centralized
server can exploit these vulnerabilities to obtain information
about private client data. At the same time, several security-
enhancing strategies can be implemented. Some of which
provide a mathematical proof of privacy preservation whilst
others show their effectiveness towards a specific attacking
strategy. The paper further lists the attack methods found
in the literature. These attacks are classified using several
characteristics: the source of attack, active and passive attacks,
white-box or black-box viability, the attacker’s goal, and fur-
ther restrictions. Furthermore, defensive measures are listed by
their underlying principle. An easy to use matrix is illustrated
that provides a rudimentary evaluation of the effectiveness of
defensive methods against attack strategies.
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